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DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR BY PUBLIC BODIES
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ABSTRACT
While in many countries the liability of public authorities in negligence resembles the 
liability of ordinary persons quite well, several exceptions which shield public authorities 
from liability remain important. A policy consideration which oft en seems to be given weight 
is the risk of defensive behaviour by public offi  cials. From a legal perspective, concerns 
regarding defensive behaviour are oft en dealt with by the rules related to discretionary 
decisions. We examine to what extent these rules in England, France and Germany are in 
accordance with the most elementary principles of the economics of defensive behaviour. 
We fi nd that the rules are compliant to a considerable extent in France and Germany, and 
to a lesser extent in England, with the economic principles underlying defensive behaviour. 
Immunity is mainly granted when there is considerable uncertainty in decision-making 
and oft en is not granted when the law specifi es the precise action to be taken by the public 
authority or when no reasonable person could come to the decision made by the public 
authority.
Keywords: defensive behaviour; discretion; economic analysis; immunity; public 
authority liability
§1. INTRODUCTION
In many countries, the liability of public authorities in negligence resembles the liability of 
ordinary persons quite well. However, based on explicit or implicit policy considerations, 
exceptions which shield public authorities from liability remain important. Some policy 
concerns are only relevant in some countries. For example, the argument of scarce public 
resources or their diversion from important public functions has had an eff ect on the 
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stance of courts in England, but not at all or much less in France and Germany.1 One 
policy consideration which seems to be given weight in almost all countries is the risk 
of defensive behaviour by public offi  cials.2 Empirical research shows that such eff ects do 
exist in some situations.3
Th eoretical research has argued that whether defensive practices arise in specifi c 
contexts depends on many factors such as the degree of uncertainty regarding the 
desirable behaviour, the scale of damages or reputational risk if found liable, whether 
there can be liability for defensive behaviour, whether public authorities are insured 
against liability losses and elements related to the internal organization of the public 
authority.4
From a legal perspective, concerns regarding defensive behaviour are oft en dealt with 
by the rules related to discretionary decisions. In this article, we examine to what extent 
these rules in England, France and Germany are in accordance with the most elementary 
principles of the economics of defensive behaviour. Th ese rules should provide a good 
balance between providing incentives to take adequate care and providing disincentives 
to adopt a defensive attitude.
Th is article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we analyse defensive behaviour 
due to liability from an economic perspective. Section 3 discusses how the laws in 
England, France and Germany deal with discretionary decisions and to what extent 
these laws are in accordance with basic economic criteria. Section 4 off ers concluding 
remarks.
§2. THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOUR
Legal standards are fraught with uncertainty.5 Th is uncertainty has several sources. 
First, courts may err in determining due levels of care. For example, they may hold a 
civil servant negligent for granting a permit for an activity that later caused considerable 
harm, even though granting the permit was reasonable from an ex ante perspective.6 
Equally, the court may mistakenly not hold a civil servant liable for granting a permit 
1 See the various country reports in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative 
Perspective (Intersentia, 2016).
2 Ibid.
3 For an overview of empirical research related to defensive behaviour in the context of public authority 
liability and an analysis of the various factors which may infl uence defensive behaviour, see J. De Mot 
and M. Faure, ‘Public Authority Liability and Th e Chilling Eff ect’, 22 Tort Law Review (2014), p. 120–
133.
4 Ibid.
5 See e.g. K. Oliphant, ‘Against Certainty in Tort Law’, in S. Pitel, J. Neyers and E. Chamberlain (eds.), 
Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart Publishing, 2013), p. 1.
6 Behavioural law and economics has shown that it is quite likely that judges will ex post hold that, with 
hindsight, the tortfeasor could have prevented the harm at reasonable costs, even though this may ex 
ante not have been clear at all. It is referred to as the hindsight bias. For a detailed discussion see J.J. 
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which should not have been granted. Second, courts can make errors in assessing an 
injurer’s factual level of care. For example, a physician may have performed a diagnostic 
test,7 but the court might think that he did not. On the other hand, the court may believe 
that the physician performed a diagnostic test when he did not. Th ird, a party may be 
unable to completely control his momentary level of duty of care. For example, a driver 
may not be able to control his level of duty of care at every given moment, perhaps 
because of a lapse of attention, a sneeze, and so forth.
In many cases, the underlying cause of uncertainty is the diffi  culty in determining 
the socially desirable level of care for either the potential injurer (ex ante) and/or the court 
(ex post). Police offi  cers for example may have to decide how aggressively to intervene in 
a confl ict. Th ey must then balance the risks to presumed criminals against the risks 
to victims. Logically, there may be much disagreement in society as to the optimal 
aggression police offi  cers should exercise in certain types of confl icts.
Another example concerns an administrative agency that has to make a decision 
to approve or not approve a particular drug: it needs to balance the potential costs of 
not allowing the drug (losing the positive eff ects of the drug and hence more illnesses 
which cannot be prevented) against yet another external cost (the potential danger of 
side eff ects or other negative eff ects resulting from the use of the drug). Such balancing is 
sometimes extremely diffi  cult, and even if the agency performs this exercise with optimal 
care, it is still possible that a court will disagree with the decision of the agency if harm 
arises. With respect to England, Marsh notes that ‘[t]he way in which English law on the 
negligence liability of public bodies has evolved over the last two decades suggests that 
it would not be imprudent for public bodies to assume that the boundaries of negligence 
are rather uncertain’.8
Th e magnitude of the consequences of uncertain legal standards on the behaviour 
of potential injurers depends on whether the potential injurer acts on his own behalf 
or is a public entity. We fi rst look at the former situation. For reasons of simplicity, we 
will focus on the situation in which courts may err in determining due levels of care. 
More specifi cally, courts may either be too severe (holding the defendant liable, even 
though he did not behave negligently, this is called a ‘type I-error’), or too lenient (not 
holding the defendant liable, even though he behaved negligently, this is called a ‘type 
II-error’). Of course, when the type and magnitude of the court’s errors are perfectly 
known in advance, injurers do not face any uncertainty. But oft en a potential injurer 
faces a certain probability that the court will be too severe and a certain probability that 
Rachlinski, ‘A Positive Psychological Th eory of Judging in Hindsight’, 65 Th e University of Chicago Law 
Review (1998), p. 571.
7 For example: listening carefully to a person’s heartbeat aft er some exercises. Such a test may not be 
easily verifi able, unlike for example an electrocardiogram.
8 A. Marsh, ‘Th e impact of liability on public bodies: lessons from the literature’, Socio-Legal Studies 
Association Conference 2008, Manchester, 18–20 March 2008.
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the court will be too lenient. Th is introduces the element of uncertainty.9 We can easily 
see that the infl uence of type I and type II errors is quite diff erent by looking at a simple 
numerical example. Th e fi rst column represents the level of care a potential injurer can 
take. Th e second column represents the costs of each level of precaution (one unit of 
precaution costs € 1,000). Th e third column represents the expected costs of an accident 
(the probability of an accident times the loss in case an accident happens) for each level 
of precaution.10
Precaution level Costs of precaution Expected costs of accident Total social costs
0 0 100,000 100,000
1 1,000 50,000 51,000
2 2,000 30,000 32,000
3 3,000 25,000 28,000
4 4,000 23,000 27,000
5 5,000 22,500 27,500
Clearly, the optimal level of precaution equals 4 units. Th e total social costs – the sum 
of precaution costs and expected accident costs – is smaller for 4 units (27,000) than for 
any other level of precaution (100,000; 51,000; 32,000; 28,000 and 27,500 respectively). 
Under an error-free negligence rule, in which all judges set due care at 4 units, a potential 
injurer will take optimal care. If he takes less care (0; 1; 2 or 3 units), he does not even 
bear the precaution costs and the expected costs of an accident (100,000; 51,000; 32,000 
and 28,000 respectively). In other words, he bears the total social costs. But the total 
social costs are lowest for 4 units (27,000), and if he takes 4 units, he doesn’t even bear 
all the costs, but only the costs of precaution (4,000). Th us he will not be inclined to take 
anything less than 4 units. Similarly, the potential injurer will not take more precaution 
than the socially optimal level of due care (he will not take 5 units). Th ere simply is no 
benefi t for the injurer to take more than 4 units. As soon as he takes due care (4 units), he 
will never have to pay damages. If he takes due care, his cost equates to 4,000. If he takes 
an additional unit, his cost is 5,000. So taking 4 units is cheaper.
Th ings change however when we introduce the possibility of judicial error. We will 
fi rst look at the case in which the court is too lenient, and then at the case in which the 
court is too strict. For reasons of mathematical simplicity, we have separated these cases 
9 Note that even when there is only a probability that the court will be too severe or only a probability 
that the court will be too lenient, uncertainty exists. However, a combination of both possibilities seems 
most realistic.
10 We have of course made up the numbers in this example. However, they are realistic in the sense that we 
assume that more investments in precaution (hence increasing precaution costs) reduce the expected 
accident costs, but that the marginal return on those investments is decreasing. Th is is a standard 
assumption in the economic analysis of accident law. See for example S. Shavell, ‘Strict Liability versus 
Negligence’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies (1980), p. 1–25.
Discretion and the Economics of Defensive Behaviour by Public Bodies
23 MJ 4 (2016) 599
and assume that the potential injurer knows the type and magnitude of the error in 
advance. In reality, as we have stated above, the potential injurer does not know with 
certainty which type of error will be made. Courts will make a type I error with a certain 
probability and a type 2 error with a certain probability. Th e total eff ect of this uncertain 
situation follows from combining the two results from the separate analyses. Suppose 
the injurer knows that judges set due care at 3 units instead of 4. Th en a potential injurer 
will take 3 units instead of 4. As soon as he takes 3 units of care, he will not be held liable 
for any damages. His private cost is minimal when he takes 3 units of care (3,000 versus 
100,000, 51,000, 32,000, 4,000 and 5,000 respectively). Note that the advantage for the 
potential injurer for this type of judicial error is 1,000: without the error, the injurer 
would have spend 4 units of care (cost of 4,000), with the error he only spends 3 units 
(cost of 3,000).
We now look at the other type of error. Suppose the potential injurer knows that 
judges set due care at 5 units. Th en he will eff ectively take 5 units of care. For any lower 
number of units, the injurer will bear all the costs (100,000, 51,000, 28,000, 27,000). If 
he takes 5 units, he only bears the costs of precaution (5,000). Note that the advantage 
of taking too much care is quite large (22,000). If the injurer only takes 4 units, he bears 
an expected cost of 27,000. If he takes 5 units, he pays only 5,000. So in conclusion, the 
eff ect of type I and type II errors is diff erent. Even when both types of errors are equally 
likely from an ex ante perspective (for example there us a 10% chance for a type I error 
and a 10% chance for a type II error), potential injurers will be more inclined to take too 
much care than too little care.
We now argue that this problem of over-precaution (defensive practices) is much 
more serious where a public authority is involved. A private tortfeasor typically balances 
an external cost (the expected accident cost) against an internal cost (his precaution 
cost). Th e incentive of such a tortfeasor to take too much precaution is limited, since he 
has to pay all the costs of over-precaution himself.
However, public authority offi  cials typically balance two external costs.11 Unlike the 
private tortfeasor, the public authority itself does not bear the costs of over-precaution. 
Th e public authority is thus much more inclined towards taking too much precaution, 
because others are bearing the costs of it. For example, fi refi ghters balance damage 
caused by water (due to an intervention) against damage caused by fi re (the costs of 
inaction). Both of these costs are externalized. Similarly, a safety inspector balances the 
expected costs of accidents against the costs of taking precautions. Th e former are borne 
by the victims (in case of an accident), the latter by the inspected fi rm (for example as 
additional safety measures).12 Briefl y summarized, the combination of the uncertainty 
11 Th is point is stressed in G. De Geest, ‘Who should be immune from tort liability?’, 41 Journal of Legal 
Studies (2012), p. 291.
12 As De Geest argues, these injurers are in a multitasking agent situation. Th e multitasking agent 
literature shows that incentives usually need to be soft er for these agents than for single-task agents, 
because hard incentives for one output can distort the incentives for the other output. For example, 
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of legal standards and the possibility of the government to externalize the costs of over-
precaution may lead to strongly defensive behaviour.
We stress that chilling behaviour is less likely when public authorities can be held 
liable for their defensive behaviour.13 Public authorities can sometimes be held liable for 
acting too cautiously. If a public authority for example declines to grant a permit because 
it fears that the activities of the company asking for the permit may cause harm for which 
the authority could be held liable, and the courts determine ex post that it should have 
granted the permit, then the government may be held liable and be forced to compensate 
the lost profi ts. Public authorities thus need to balance the potential liability costs of 
being too lenient with the potential liability costs of being too strict.
Several particularities of a legal system may infl uence this balancing undertaken 
by the public authority. Not all legal systems impose liability for pure omissions:14 for 
instance, there is no general duty of care in tort to prevent harm occurring to another 
in the common law.15 Th e normal mechanism for creating affi  rmative duties of action is 
contract or statute. Due to the nonfeasance doctrine, public authorities can pull out from 
providing certain services without the fear of liability. Th is may substantially enhance 
the scope for chilling eff ects. Another example concerns the rules on pure economic 
loss. In some jurisdictions, when the courts are faced with a loss which does not stem 
from any physical damage to the claimant or her property, this loss is not recoverable in 
the tort of negligence.16 In some cases, this can lead to chilling behaviour. Suppose that 
a public authority must decide on granting a permit to a fi rm for a dangerous activity 
which may mainly cause physical damage,17 and that not granting the permit leads to 
pure economic losses. Th en the public authority may be more likely to refuse a permit 
when pure economic losses are not recoverable. By not granting a permit, it can escape 
liability costs in case the activity causes physical harm and the court concludes that the 
authority was too lenient when granting the permit, without having to be concerned 
about potential liability payments in case a court would be in the opinion that the permit 
should have been granted.
professors who are paid per publication may neglect their teaching eff orts, when these teaching eff orts 
are hard to verify (and thus to sanction). In the context of liability, multitask agents should be allowed 
to exercise discretion within a well-defi ned zone with clear minimum constraints. Th e reason is that 
uncertainty has a strong chilling eff ect in a multitasking agent situation, because the multitasking agent 
does not internalize the precaution costs. For example, if a public servant needs to decide whether a 
fi rm should get a permit or not to carry out a risky activity that can cause substantial harm to third 
parties. See G. De Geest, 41 Journal of Legal Studies (2012).
13 Th is is an important diff erence with private actors. If these take too much care due to uncertain legal 
standards, the usual consequence for them is that their private costs of prevention increase.
14 In other words, whether there is liability not only for misfeasance, but also for nonfeasance.
15 Smith v. Littlewood Organisations Ltd [1987] 2 AC 241.
16 On pure economic loss in Europe, see M. Bussani and V. Palmer (eds.), Pure Economic Loss in Europe 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003).
17 And there is a probability that the authority will be held liable for the losses.
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To keep the numerical example as simple as possible, we have assumed that there 
is one single actor who bears the consequences of a liability verdict. In reality, things 
are more complex. Oft en the individual civil servant cannot be held personally liable, 
except for gross negligence or intent, but the agency can be held liable. Furthermore, 
sometimes a public authority has a right of recourse against its civil servant, but this 
right is not always used. However, also under these circumstances, chilling eff ects can 
arise. First, other consequences apart from the payment of damages can be attached to 
a liability verdict (and the prospect of it) and these may have strong incentivizing eff ects 
as well. A civil servant who committed a fault may face disciplinary sanctions (such as 
dismissal). In addition, non-fi nancial costs – such as loss of time, stress, and especially 
damage to reputation – are also important. From the point of view of the individual civil 
servant, engaging in defensive behaviour can also limit these kind of costs. With respect 
to reputational loss, Epp writes
what agency offi  cials fear most about liability is the threat of public embarrassment and 
reputational damage. Although losing a costly case is undoubtedly embarrassing, lawsuits 
have the potential to erode an agency’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public even if the agency 
wins. As one offi  cial observed to me, ‘Lawsuits bring publicity, and publicity alters the public 
perception of us, and for practical purposes, perception is reality. So that can be a big cost, and 
it can take a long time to overcome it’.18
Note that empirical research by Hartshorne et al. shows that higher level offi  cials may 
not always inform lower level offi  cials about liability verdicts that could be relevant for 
them in the future because this could lead to overly defensive behaviour.19 Second, when 
civil servants can be held liable for gross negligence, and there is uncertainty whether 
a type of behaviour will be regarded by the courts as not negligent, slightly negligent or 
grossly negligent, chilling behaviour may once again arise.
§3. THE LAW
Th eoretical and empirical analysis shows that defensive behaviour can materialize under 
certain circumstances. Consequently the question arises as to how the law can prevent 
such behaviour or at least reduce its occurrence. Given that uncertainty (whether the 
correct standard will be applied by the courts) is at the heart of defensive behaviour, 
the most straightforward remedy is to provide more certainty. Of course, policymakers 
could try to formulate laws as precisely as possible, but obviously there is a limit to 
that. No matter how clearly rules are formulated, there will always be some residual 
18 C. Epp, Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation of the Legalistic State (University 
of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 22.
19 See J. Hartshorne, N. Smith and R. Everton, ‘Caparo under fi re: a study of the eff ects upon the Fire 
Service of liability in negligence’, 63 Modern Law Review (2006), p. 502–522.
Jef De Mot and Michael G. Faure
602 23 MJ 4 (2016)
uncertainty.20 Additional certainty can be provided by granting immunity for decisions 
which are inherently surrounded by substantial uncertainty. Naturally, this immunity 
should not go further than necessary. First, when the law specifi es the precise actions the 
public authority must take, there is no uncertainty and no need for immunity. Second, 
even when the law fails to specify the precise action that the public authority must take, 
granting immunity is not always desirable. When a public authority makes a policy 
choice that no reasonable person would ever make, there should be no immunity. Th is 
will not lead to defensive behaviour.
We will now examine whether the law in England, France and Germany is in 
accordance with three criteria which follow from our framework. Note that criterion 2 
and 3 are corollaries of the fi rst, most basic criterion:
1. Immunity should only be granted when there is substantial uncertainty in decision-
making;
2. Immunity should not be granted when the law specifi es the precise action to be taken 
by the public authority;
3. Th ere should be no immunity if no reasonable person could come to the decision 
made by the public authority.
A. ENGLAND
In general, public authorities in England are subject to the same tortious liabilities as 
private persons.21 Th e most important bases of claim are negligence, breach of statutory 
duty and misfeasance in public offi  ce.22 A public employer is strictly liable for torts 
committed by its employees in the scope of their employment, but the employee may 
also be sued personally by the victim, and the employer has a right of indemnity against 
the employee23 (but this is almost never exercised).24 However, various devices have 
been conceived to restrict the liability for the negligence of public offi  cials (discretion, 
20 Note that one also has to take into account the costs of formulating clearer rules. Also, ‘bright line’ 
rules do not necessarily provide more certainty than an approach where relevant factors are identifi ed, 
a weight is attached to each factor, and on that basis courts make a fl exible assessment. See K. Oliphant, 
in S. Pitel, J. Neyers and E. Chamberlain, Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy, p. 1.
21 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v. Gibbs (1866, Law Reports (1st series) LR 1 House of Lords 
(HL) 93) established that public bodies have no blanket immunity from liability in tort. Th e Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947 almost completely abolished Crown immunity.
22 Negligence is by far the most used basis. To examine the issue of the duty of care, the three stage test 
developed in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman (1990 2 AC 605, 617–618) is used. It must be reasonably 
foreseeable that the conduct of the defendant will cause damage to the plaintiff ; there must be suffi  cient 
proximity between the parties and it must be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. Note 
that the last basis (misfeasance in public offi  ce) applies only to public offi  cials.
23 Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555.
24 See the country report on England and Wales in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e Liability of Public Authorities in 
Comparative Perspective (Intersentia, 2016).
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justiciability, the policy sphere), and courts are more willing to negate a duty of care for 
reasons of public policy when the defendant is an emanation of the state.25 It is generally 
acknowledged that the liability of public authorities in England is relatively restricted.26 
Several liabilities that other European systems would consider typical cannot arise in 
England (such as the negligent refusal of a licence or permit).27
Th e concept of discretion is of vital signifi cance in English case law on public 
authority liability. When conduct falls within the ambit of discretion conferred on 
the defendant by Parliament, no liability should arise. In the Dorset Yacht28 case, Lord 
Reid wrote ‘Where Parliament confers a discretion (…) there may, and almost certainly 
will, be errors of judgment in exercising such a discretion and Parliament cannot have 
intended that members of the public should be entitled to sue in respect of such errors’. 
Th is can clearly be linked to our fi rst economic criterion, the element of uncertainty 
underlying defensive behaviour. In other cases, the risk of detrimental defensive action 
by public offi  cials (so-called ‘overkill’) is expressly mentioned as a policy consideration 
to be careful with public authority liability.29 Marsh notes
[if] (…) the standard of reasonableness or, more generally, the limits of liability are highly 
uncertain then it is not possible to identify the appropriate level of investment in harm-
reduction measures: this could lead those who are risk-averse to invest heavily in ‘good’ 
administrative practice to maximize their chances of meeting whatever standard will be 
applied, to the extent that de facto defensive administration is the result.30
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that discretion cannot be looked at in ‘all-or-nothing’ 
terms.31 Th e nature of discretion moves along a sliding scale. Th e mere existence of some 
element of discretion is not suffi  cient to rule out a duty of care.32 Referring to the fi rst 
of our economic criteria, uncertainty needs to be substantial.  In some situations, the 
optimal decision may be uncertain, but it may be quite clear that it lies in a narrow 
interval. Extending the scope of discretion beyond that interval will not further reduce 
defensive behaviour, but may give inadequate incentives to take adequate care. In Anns 
v. Merton LBC,33 Lord Wilberforce related the concept of discretion to the distinction 
25 K. Oliphant, ‘Th e Liability of Public Authorities in England and Wales’, in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e 
Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective.
26 See e.g. C. Van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 473.
27 See Jain v. Trent Strategic Health Authority (2009) UKHL 4, (2009) AC 853.
28 (1970) AC 1004, 1031.
29 See e.g. Rowling v. Takaro Properties Ltd (1988) AC 473, 502 per Lord Keith (Privy Council); Hill v. Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire (1989) AC 53, 63 per Lord Keith.
30 A. Marsh, ‘Th e impact of liability on public bodies: lessons from the literature’, Socio-Legal Studies 
Association Conference 2008, Manchester, 18–20 March 2008.
31 See e.g. K. Oliphant, in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective.
32 See Barrett v. London Borough of Enfi eld, (2001) 2 AC 550, 571 per Lord Slynn.
33 (1978) AC 728, 754.
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between policy spheres and operational spheres.34 Th e former is strongly linked with 
planning activities (such as assessing budgetary priorities), while the latter refers to the 
practical execution of policy decisions. According to Lord Wilberforce, when a public 
body is acting in the policy sphere, the courts should abstain – wholly or in part – from 
interfering with their activities by subjecting them to a duty of care. Th e more operational 
a power or duty is, the easier it is to superimpose on it a duty of care. Th is makes sense 
from an economic perspective and can be linked to our fi rst (policy) and second 
(operational) criteria. Acts with a planning nature are more likely to be surrounded 
with substantial uncertainty than the execution of set tasks. For decisions in the policy 
sphere, policymakers need to balance various precious but confl icting interests such as 
order, individual liberty, personal security, care of the vulnerable and so on.35 Obviously, 
for such diffi  cult exercises, opinions in society may diff er strongly and thus uncertainty 
would loom large in the absence of (partial) immunities.
In some cases, English courts have used ‘irrationality’ or ‘Wednesbury 
unreasonableness’36 as a precondition of the liability of a public authority.37 A decision 
or action is irrational if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable public authority could 
have reached or done it. Th is is clearly in line with the third economic principle.
Not all rules of English public authority liability are in accordance with the 
economic precepts related to defensive behaviour. First, a breach of statutory duty 
causing damage can only attract liability if it can be shown that Parliament intended 
to protect the class of which the claimant is a member from the adversity in question 
and also had in mind to provide a remedy in damages if damage should result. Th e 
courts have been rather disinclined to fi nd any intent to impose liability in damages 
where a public authority is the defendant.38 Obviously, this restrictive attitude goes 
much further than what economics would prescribe to prevent defensive behaviour. 
Statutory duties are oft en described quite precisely, and thus defensive behaviour 
is quite unlikely. Second, some exclusions from liability, to the extent that these 
provide (quasi) blanket immunities, are not sound from an economic perspective. 
For example, systematically denying a duty of care for the police in the investigation 
and suppression of crime is a bridge too far. In the current situation, a victim of a 
human rights violation resulting from gross negligent police behaviour can be denied 
34 Note that in the case of Rowling v. Takaro Properties Ltd ((1988) AC 473, 501), Lord Keith noted that 
the policy-operations distinction is not ‘a touchstone of liability’. In other words, it does not in itself 
determine whether there is a duty of care.
35 P. Schuck, ‘Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Offi  cial Wrongs’, 68 Yale University Press (1983), 
p. 64.
36 In public law, a public authority’s conduct is unlawful if it is illegal, procedurally improper or 
irrational. Th e test of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ was developed in Associated Provincial Picture 
Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp (1948) 1 King’s Bench (KB) 223.
37 See K. Oliphant, in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective.
38 Law Commission 2008, para. 4.75 et seq.
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a remedy based on the defensive practice argument.39 However, it is diffi  cult to argue 
that police offi  cers face substantial uncertainty from an ex ante perspective for this 
kind of behaviour.
B. FRANCE
To a large extent, French law on public authority liability seems to be at the opposite 
side of English law. France has a rather broad liability for public authorities.40 Public 
authorities have been found liable in diverse spheres such as those of the social services, 
the police, the emergency services, education, highway maintenance, regulatory 
activities, licensing and immigration authorities. In l’arrêt Blanco of 8 February 1873,41 
the Tribunal des Confl its accorded jurisdiction to the administrative courts to decide 
actions brought against the state ‘for damages caused by the actions of persons which 
it employs in the public service’ and pronounced a broad principle of state liability. Th e 
administrative courts gradually developed the principles of state liability, and in the 
process circumvented the impact of various statutory immunities.42 According to the 
general principle, liability will arise whenever a public body commits a fault that causes 
a loss.43 When the loss stems from an administrative act, any form of illegality (public 
law unlawfulness, substantive or procedural) constitutes fault per se (‘unlawfulness 
equals fault’). Th e only acts which are considered not to be justiciable are ‘actes de 
gouvernement’.44
When the loss arises due to physical acts of public bodies, it will be determined 
whether a ‘ faute de service’ has occurred. Neither the legislature nor the courts have 
given a specifi c defi nition of this concept.45 According to many academics, one has to 
investigate whether the standard of normal operation of the administration has been 
breached. A malfunctioning of the administrative machinery gives rise to a fault.46 
39 See also D. Walsh, ‘Police Liability for a Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime: Enhancing Accountability 
by Clearing the Public Policy Fog’, 22 King’s Law Journal (2011), p. 27–55.
40 See B. Markesinis et al., Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies: a Comparative and Economic Analysis 
of Five English Cases (Hart Publishing, 1999): ‘It is impossible to proceed and compare specifi c cases 
before stressing how diff erent French and English law are in their approach towards the question of 
administrative liability’.
41 TC 8 February 1873, Blanco, D. 1873.3.17.
42 See D. Fairgrieve and F. Lichere, ‘Th e Liability of Public Authorities in France’, in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e 
Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective.
43 Note that this is supplemented with various heads of liability without fault. However, these are not 
within the scope of this article.
44 Th ese acts concern France’s international relationship with other countries, the relationship between 
the executive and Parliament, and measures taken to protect French nationals and their property 
abroad.
45 See C. Gour, ‘Faute de Service’, in F. Gazier and R. Drago (eds), Dalloz Encyclopédie de Droit Public: 
Répertoire de la Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique (Dalloz, 2015), para. 116–148.
46 D. Fairgrieve and F. Lichere, ‘Th e Liability of Public Authorities in France’, in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e 
Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective.
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While public bodies are liable for a ‘ faute de service’ before the administrative courts, a 
public servant can be held personally liable before the ordinary civil courts if his or her 
conduct amounts to a ‘ faute personnelle’. Oft en the victim has the option to sue either 
the public authority before the administrative courts or the civil servant before the civil 
courts. It is not easy to distinguish between a ‘ faute de service’ and a ‘ faute personnelle’. 
Th e courts take various factors into account, such as the state of mind of the offi  cial (such 
as corruption or personal gain), his or her behaviour (such as the use of disproportionate 
force), and motive (such as acts motivated by vengeance).47 If the cause of the damage 
lies in a personal fault of the civil servant, a claim may be made cumulatively against 
the public authority if there is a nexus with employment. Th e Conseil d’Etat recognized 
that there can be a dual fault (‘ faute de service’ and ‘ faute personnelle’) that may lead to 
an action against the public authority. Furthermore, the Conseil d’Etat recognizes the 
possibility to sue the public authority even when there is no ‘ faute de service’ when the 
offi  cial’s acts are ‘not deprived of any link with the public service’. While a public body 
can bring a recursory action against the public servant who was responsible for the ‘ faute 
personnelle’, such actions are rarely initiated.
At fi rst sight, French public authority liability is very broad and seems to leave little 
room for immunity, for example in case of uncertain decision-making. It would seem 
that the economic criteria do not play a role. However, there are particular cases where 
the fault standard is increased to ‘ faute lourde’ (gross negligence). Th is notion has been 
regarded as a judicial means of showing deference to the legitimate exercise of discretion 
by public bodies.48 Especially in the regulatory and the supervisory sphere, where 
uncertainty oft en looms large, judicial fears of second-guessing have been put to rest 
by the application of ‘ faute lourde’. Furthermore, the danger of defensive behaviour has 
been explicitly referred to in a conclusion of the Commissaire du Gouvernement Rivet 
before the French Conseil d’Etat.49 Th e Commissaire du Gouvernement argued that the 
danger of defensive practices may be an argument in favour of a higher standard of care 
(‘ faute lourde’), more particularly in order to protect the police from actions in tort. He 
held: ‘In order to fulfi l the diffi  cult task of maintaining order on the streets, the police 
must not have their activities hindered by the threat of complicated litigation’.
Originally, ‘ faute lourde’ was applied in numerous categories of state liability. More 
recently however, the administrative courts have set in motion a decline in the use of this 
concept,50 for example in domains like medical care and the emergency services. To the 
extent that uncertainty regarding desirable behaviour is smaller in these spheres than in 
those in which ‘ faute lourde’ is still applied, a shift  to ‘ faute simple’ can be in accordance 
with the criteria of our economic framework. An interesting example involves the 
47 Gross negligence and recklessness can be seen as a personal fault if they are ‘serious’ enough. See e.g. 
Cass. October 21, 1997.
48 Ibid.
49 CE 13 March 1925, Clef, Revue du Droit Public (RDP) 1925.274,276.
50 R. Chapus, Droit Administratif Général, para. 1463.
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lack of suffi  cient warnings for leisure activities in public places. When it concerns a 
crowded place, ‘ faute simple’ is used. Otherwise, the requirement is ‘ faute lourde’. Th is is 
economically sound and corresponds to an application of the fi rst economic criterium. 
When a crowded place is involved, it is quite clear that substantial warnings, which are 
oft en not too costly, can be socially valuable. For places that are not frequented oft en, 
there can be substantial uncertainty about the productivity of investments in warnings 
and thus whether these funds could be better used elsewhere.
Interestingly, the standard of ‘ faute lourde’ has also been used in a case in which 
depositors of a failed bank claimed that the banking regulator (la Commission Bancaire) 
had undertaken its supervisory duty negligently. Th e Commissaire du Gouvernement 
Seban advocated that a higher standard should be used, inter alia because the victims 
suff ered solely ‘pure economic loss’, which would merit less protection by the courts.51 
In economic analysis, the desirability of compensation for pure economic loss has been 
highly debated for a variety of reasons, one of them being that pure economic loss does 
not create a social loss, but only a transfer of wealth.52 Note that the introduction of the 
requirement of a ‘ faute lourde’ may also make sense from the perspective of defensive 
behaviour. Th e uncertainty surrounding the decisions of banking regulators may be 
substantial (criterion 1); given the complexity of the tasks of banking regulators precise 
actions they need to take can generally not be set up in advance (criterion 2 is not 
applicable); and given that the fi nancial and reputational costs of liability may be large, 
there may be a real risk of defensive practices.53
Finally, there are economic reasons that may justify the illegality-fault parity in 
French law. Ideally, fault should be the key issue, not unlawfulness. But there are practical 
hurdles which need to be taken into account. An example may illustrate this. Suppose a 
civil servant has to take a decision in 1,000 (permit) cases each year. In each case, he or 
she needs to check whether 10 specifi c regulations are complied with. It may very well be 
that it is economically optimal that the civil servant invests his time and eff ort in these 
cases until there will be on average 995 cases decided correctly, and 5 that are not. It may 
thus be the case that further investments by the civil servant are not socially desirable, 
even though they could still reduce his or her error rate. Th is will be the case when the 
benefi ts of further investments (reduced error costs) are smaller than their costs (extra 
time, eff ort and so on). So even when the civil servant behaves optimally (no fault), there 
may still be an unlawful decision on his part (such as on average 5 in 1,000). Now there 
are two possibilities: either the amount of time and eff ort the civil servant spends on 
51 CE 30 November 2001, Kechichian, conclusions A. Seban, Les Petites Affi  ches, no. 28, 7 February 2002, 
7, 12, 13. Th e plenary session of the Conseil d’Etat followed this solution (Conseil d’Etat 30 November 
2001, Kechichian, AJDA 2002.136).
52 See on the desirability of the compensation of pure economic loss, J. De Mot, ‘Pure Economic Loss’, in 
M. Faure (ed.), Tort Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, 2009).
53 On the infl uence of large fi nancial and reputational costs generally, see J. De Mot and M. Faure, ‘Public 
Authority Liability and Th e Chilling Eff ect’, 22 Tort Law Review (2014), p. 126–128.
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his tasks are verifi able for the courts, or they are not. In the former case, the courts can 
simply check whether the civil servant acted negligently or not. Even though the conduct 
may have been unlawful, it could very well be that he did not commit a fault. However, in 
reality the time and eff ort spent by the civil servant will generally be unverifi able. In that 
case, unlawfulness should generally lead to the conclusion that there has been a fault. 
Th e alternative would be never to hold the civil servant liable because he could always 
claim that the unlawfulness was a mere accident (occurring 5 in 1,000 times even when 
he behaves without fault).54 In other words, when behaviour is not verifi able (at all), it 
may be wise to assimilate unlawfulness with fault, to preserve incentives. Expressed in 
another way, this comes down to creating a pocket of strict liability into the negligence 
rule.
C. GERMANY
With respect to public liability in Germany, the main legal basis can be found in §839 
of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; BGB) in conjunction with Article 34 Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz; GG).55 Th e liability of the individual civil servant and of the public 
authority where the civil servant works are strictly coupled. §839 BGB states:
If an offi  cial wilfully or negligently commits a breach of offi  cial duty incumbent upon him 
towards a third party, he shall compensate the third party for any damage arising therefrom. 
If only negligence is imputable to the offi  cial, he may be held liable only if the injured party is 
unable to obtain compensation otherwise.
Article 34 GG states:
If any person, in the exercise of a public offi  ce entrusted to him, violates his offi  cial obligations 
to a third party, liability shall rest in principle on the State or the public body which employs 
him. In the event of wilful or grossly negligent conduct, the right of recourse shall be reserved.
Th e personal liability of the servant is thus substituted by the liability of the state: 
however the state may claim redress against the servant if the latter acted with intent or 
gross negligence.
German law makes a distinction between decisions involving discretion and ‘bound 
decisions’. Discretion can comprise the choice whether to act or which decision to take56 
(at least when the requirements of the statute authorizing the exercise of discretion are 
fulfi lled). If the offi  cial acts within the ambit of the discretion conferred upon him, 
there shall be no liability. Note however that German courts do not identify an area of 
54 A more refi ned alternative could be to hold the civil servant liable in case of repeated errors.
55 See U. Magnus, ‘Th e liability of public authorities in Germany’, in K. Oliphant (ed.), Th e Liability of 
Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective.
56 H. Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (11th edition, C.H. Beck, 1997), p. 121–122.
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discretion which is beyond any judicial control from the outset. Although the courts are 
not allowed to substitute their decision for the one of the public body, they can review 
specifi c errors of the public body in the exercise of its discretion. For liability to arise, it 
is suffi  cient that the offi  cial applied his discretion incorrectly, even if it did not amount to 
evident abuse.57 Th is seems to be in line with the fi rst two economic principles described 
above. For decisions involving discretion, and thus substantial uncertainty, there may be 
immunity; for other decisions involving set tasks and thus no or little uncertainty, there 
is no immunity. Moreover, the immunity does not go further than necessary and thus 
prevents defensive behaviour while at the same time preserving incentives for acting 
carefully. Obviously there is no immunity if no reasonable person could come to the 
decision made by the public authority (criterion 3).
Article  34 GG is seen as a way of protecting the individual offi  cial from the risk 
of personal liability which could otherwise lead to a defensive approach. Th is would 
also indirectly benefi t public authorities because their functioning depends on the 
performance of their offi  cials.58 Interestingly, the purpose of the subsidiarity clause in 
§839(I)(2) BGB, which was created almost 50 years before Article 34 GG, was also to 
maintain the decisiveness of public offi  cials.59 According to the subsidiarity clause, public 
authority liability comes subsidiary to the liability of other liable persons. If redress is 
possible from those persons, they will have to bear the full loss and public authority 
liability is excluded. For example, when an explosion of a fi reworks factory takes place, 
victims may want to hold the public authority liable for either having wrongly issued 
the licence60 or for insuffi  cient supervision of the imposed conditions. However, the 
primary tortfeasor will oft en be the operator of the fi reworks facility. Th e fact that in 
Germany victims fi rst have to address the potentially liable operator could substantially 
restrict public authority liability and therefore help to mitigate defensive behaviour in 
some cases. However, given that the public offi  cial is already protected by Article 34 GG, 
the subsidiarity clause no longer seems necessary. Moreover, the clause may reduce the 
public authority’s incentive to take adequate care in some circumstances. Suppose the 
public authority needs to supervise whether a fi reworks company stores its fi reworks 
appropriately and that the supervisor knows there is a chance that the company will, 
due to a lack of expertise, not store the fi reworks carefully. If the company has suffi  cient 
fi nancial means to pay damages,61 the supervisor knows that the public authority will 
not be held liable if harm materializes because of the subsidiary nature of its liability. 
57 BGHZ 74, 144, 156; 75, 120, 124; O. Palandt and H. Heinrichs, BGB (58th edition, C.H. Beck, 1999), 
§839, margin note 36.
58 K. Windthorst and H. Sproll, Staatshaft ungsrecht (1st edition, C.H. Beck, 1994), p. 59–60.
59 B. Mugdan (ed.), Die gesamten Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich 
(Deckers Verlag, 1899), p. 1385–1403; F. Ossenbühl, Staatshaft ungsrecht (5th edition, C.H. Beck, 1998), 
p. 79.
60 E.g. that in that particular residential area such a factory would not be allowed or that insuffi  ciently 
strict conditions were imposed.
61 In reality, this may seldom be the case.
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Consequently the incentive to monitor the primary tortfeasor properly is reduced. In 
1981, the legislator tried to abolish the subsidiarity clause, but the act was later declared 
unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court because of lack of legislative 
competence of the Federation.62
§4. CONCLUSION
Th e basic rules of public authority liability are compliant to a considerable extent in France 
and Germany, and to a lesser extent in England, with the economic principles underlying 
defensive behaviour. Immunity is mainly granted when there is considerable uncertainty 
in decision-making and is oft en not granted when the law specifi es the precise action to 
be taken by the public authority or when no reasonable person could come to the decision 
made by the public authority. With respect to England, the distinction between policy 
spheres and operational spheres and the concept of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ 
fi t well into the economic framework. Regarding France, the standard of faute lourde, 
when correctly applied, can provide immunity for decisions surrounded with substantial 
uncertainty, which is economically justifi ed. Similarly, the German distinction between 
decisions involving discretion and ‘bound decisions’ makes economic sense. Of course, 
each jurisdiction has its own peculiar rules which makes it deviate from economic 
optimality. For example, the German rule of subsidiarity may reduce the public 
authority’s incentive to take adequate care in some circumstances. And in England, the 
strict rules regarding the breach of statutory duty and the categorical exclusion of some 
liabilities go much further than necessary to prevent defensive behaviour.
62 H. Papier, ‘Article 34’, in T. Maunz and G. Dürig (eds.), Komm zGG (C.H. Beck, 1998), margin note 
89–96.
